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The George Washington University Law School  
Washington, D.C.
I. INTRODUCTION
This past year saw major developments in European public procurement law, as a number of new 
procurement directives, discussed in draft form last year, see Christopher R. Yukins, The New European 
Procurement Directives: A Critical Perspective, 2014 Gov. Con. Year Rev. Briefs 3 (Feb. 2014), finally came 
into force. This paper will focus on the two elements of the new European Union procurement direc-
tive, 2014/24/EU, most likely to affect the U.S. procurement community: new flexibility in the use of 
best-value negotiations, and expanded grounds for excluding potential contractors. The paper also will 
discuss how the new directive may affect ongoing trade negotiations regarding procurement markets.
II. POINTS OF CONVERGENCE IN THE NEW EUROPEAN DIRECTIVES
The new European procurement directives came into force on April 17, 2014. Each European 
member state now has two years to implement the new directives into their own laws. See, e.g., UK 
Cabinet Office, Guidance: Transposing EU Procurement Directives (updated Oct. 6, 2014), available 
at https://www.gov.uk/transposing-eu-procurement-directives. The new directives govern procure-
ment at all levels of government across Europe (what we would consider national, state and local 
governments in the United States). See, e.g., Pedro Telles, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The 
EU’s Internal Market, Public Procurement Thresholds, and Cross-Border Interest, 43 Pub. Cont. 
L.J. 3 (2013) (discussing role of directives); Sue Arrowsmith, The Past and Future Evolution of EC 
Procurement Law: From Framework to Common Code?, 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 337 (2006). See generally 
Sue Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, Vol. 1 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2014).
While there are several new European procurement directives -- including directives on conces-
sions, see, e.g., Richard Craven, The EU’s 2014 Concessions Directive, 2014 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 188 
(available on Westlaw); Michael Burnett, The New European Directive on the Award of Conces-
sion Contracts - Promoting Value for Money in PPP Contracts?, 9 EPPPL 86 (2014) (available on 
Westlaw), and utilities, see, e.g., Totis Kotsonis, The 2014 Utilities Directive of the EU: Codification, 
Flexibilisation and Other Misdemeanours, 2014 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 169 -- the focus here will be on 
the core public procurement directive, covering purchases of goods and services by procuring enti-
ties across Europe, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L94/65. Although this new directive is 
not intended to address defense procurement, under Article 15 it does sweep up those defense- and 
security-related purchases not covered by the European directive specifically directed to defense 
procurement, Directive 2009/81/EC. See generally Christopher R. Yukins, supra, 2014 Gov. Con. 
Year Rev. Briefs 3 (discussing scope of draft directive); Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment: 
The European Defense Procurement Directive: An American Perspective, 51 GC ¶ 383 (Nov. 4, 2009). 
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For the U.S. procurement community, the new directive, which covers 
many different aspects of procurement, from planning to bidding to award, 
is vitally important for a number of reasons. First, although the discus-
sion below is necessarily limited by space, a review of the directive’s many 
provisions clearly shows that European procurement law is increasingly 
similar to U.S. procurement law. Experienced contracting professionals 
from the United States will be able to use these similarities to their ad-
vantage, for the more the procedures converge, the easier it is for market 
participants to move from one market to the other. Second, however, in 
some ways the European directive is strikingly different from U.S. laws, 
and these differences create competitive traps for outsiders, some of which 
are touched on below. Third, understanding where the most serious traps 
lie -- where divergence creates serious competitive barriers to procure-
ment markets -- may help frame how the United States should approach 
its trade negotiations with Europe, and with other regions and nations 
following the same lines of convergence, for those negotiations provide an 
ongoing and important opportunity for harmonization. 
A. European Union’s Embrace of Flexible Negotiations
For U.S. exporters, perhaps the most important development under the 
new directive is the European Union’s embrace of flexible negotiations as 
a procurement method, much as flexible competitive negotiation methods 
have been widely adopted in the federal government. See Christopher R. 
Yukins, supra, 2014 Gov. Con. Year Rev. Briefs 3. Of the competitive pro-
cedures available under federal rules, see, e.g., Kate M. Manuel, Competi-
tion in Federal Contracting: An Overview of the Legal Requirements 8-9 
(Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. No. R40516, June 30, 2011), available at https://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40516.pdf, multilateral competitive negotia-
tions under Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 15, 48 C.F.R. Part 
15, are by far the most commonly used method for complex procurements 
(information technology and weapons systems, for example). As the discus-
sion below reflects, these developments in European Union procurement 
policy may open new opportunities for the U.S. export community, and 
more broadly may suggest new ways of thinking about more flexible ap-
proaches to public procurement.
1. Importance of Best-Value Negotiations to High  
Technology Exporters
For some time, high-technology firms have recognized that they may 
not be able to compete effectively in world procurement markets if buyers 
are locked into “sealed bidding” procurement methods (which are some-
times called “open tendering” methods in foreign procurement systems). 
See, e.g., Defense Acquisition University, Acquipedia -- Sealed Bidding 
Procedures (narrative discussion of sealed bidding process under FAR 
Part 14), available at https://dap.dau.mil/acquipedia/Pages/ArticleDetails.
aspx?aid=da800e14-bf23-44fc-892c-6f5b26dc0363. Open tendering (sealed 
bidding) methods typically emphasize price, and quality is typically set by 
the government’s previously fixed specifications, against which bidders 
often must compete on price alone. In a bidding environment of this kind, 
high-value, high-price products and services built on the latest technology 
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will typically lose; the low-priced bidder, offering a technically compliant 
but perhaps mediocre product or service, will nearly always win.
2. Comparative U.S. Federal Trend: LPTA Procurements
Within U.S. federal procurement, the tensions between sealed bidding 
and competitive negotiations have played out, in recent years, in an ongo-
ing controversy over the use of the “Lowest Price-Technically Acceptable” 
(LPTA) method. See generally Vernon J. Edwards, Lowest Price Technically 
Acceptable Source Selection: When and How Should Agencies Use It?, 26 
Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 62 (Nov. 2012). While the LPTA method is techni-
cally a form of competitive negotiation under FAR Part 15 (and exchanges 
are permitted during the procedure, per FAR 15.101-2), in practice the 
LPTA method often is not materially different from sealed bidding: of-
ferors propose against technical requirements set by the agency, and the 
lowest-priced technically acceptable offer typically wins. Under the LPTA 
approach, there is no best-value tradeoff between price and quality. FAR 
15.101-2(b)(2). 
In part because of growing budgetary pressures, federal agencies 
have resorted more to the LPTA method, see, e.g., Timothy Bunting, Lost 
and Found: In Search of A Uniform Approach for Selecting Best Value, 44 
Pub. Cont. L.J. 1 (2014), despite strong criticism from industry, see, e.g., 
Vernon J. Edwards, supra (discussing industry criticism), and concerns 
from Congress, see, e.g., Robert Nichols & Jad C. Totman, Feature Com-
ment: Myth-Busting the LPTA Conundrum, 55 GC ¶ 392 (Dec. 18, 2013) 
(discussing congressional concerns); House Rep. No. 113-102, 113th Cong., 
1st Sess. 185-86 (June 7, 2013) (House Armed Services Committee noted 
that it was concerned that “careful consideration must be given to each 
contract . . . [W]hen the requirement is complex, performance risk is high, 
or failure to perform has significant consequences . . . then a best-value 
tradeoff approach may be more appropriate”); see also GAO Report No. 
GAO-14-584 (July 2014) (study of use of best value procurements); DOD’s 
Best-Value Processes Consistent With Guidance, GAO Says, 56 GC ¶ 264 
(Aug. 13, 2014). 
Nor, it seems, are federal agencies using the LPTA method solely to 
drive down costs; as one federal acquisition official noted, quite bluntly, 
the LPTA method may be favored because it reduces potential criticism 
and accountability of federal officials. See Sean Lyngaas, DHS’s Borkowski: 
Acquisition Officials Must Get Tougher with Industry, Federal Computer 
Week, Aug. 6, 2014 (senior acquisition official noted: “You want to know 
why we do LPTA [lowest price, technically acceptable]? Because it’s safer. 
The idea in government, what we are all trained by history to do, is avoid 
consequences.”), available at http://fcw.com/articles/2014/08/06/borkowski-
gets-tough-on-acquisition.aspx; see also Daniel I. Gordon, Bid Protests: 
The Costs Are Real, but the Benefits Outweigh Them, 42 Pub. Cont. L.J. 
489, 506 (2013) (“Contracting Officers have told the author that they are 
acting to avoid bid protests when they decide that a contract should be 
awarded to the lowest-priced, technically acceptable (LPTA) proposal, 
rather than to allow for a trade-off.”).
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3. World Bank Endorses Best-Value Negotiations 
While U.S. federal agencies have turned to the LPTA method -- which 
some might say is turning back the clock to a time, several decades ago, 
when awards based on low price alone were more common in federal pro-
curement -- the World Bank has signaled that it will take the opposite 
approach, and endorse a broader use of negotiations and best-value awards 
in Bank-financed projects. See generally Jeffrey Gutman, World Bank 
Evaluation Group Issues Procurement Review: Do the Conclusions Fit the 
Analysis, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/12/23-
world-bank-procurement-gutman (Dec. 23, 2013) (discussing background 
to current round of World Bank procurement reforms). This is a change in 
World Bank practice, and, because of the large role that the World Bank 
plays in the developing world, the new policy marks an important new 
direction. The report on consultations regarding proposed reforms to the 
Bank’s procurement policies stated, for example:
A point made frequently in the external consultations was 
that the Bank’s procedures allow for awarding contracts on 
the basis of the lowest price alone. This is not the case. The 
Bank’s Procurement Guidelines allow considerable latitude 
to include factors other than price, such as quality and after-
sales service. However, in applying the policy, Bank staff and 
counterparts often choose the lowest evaluated bid based on price 
alone, perhaps because it is less complicated to do or is perceived 
to be less risky. It may also conform to local practices and 
procurement rules that require decisions to be made on the basis 
of the lowest price. A further contributing factor may be that 
economy is commonly understood as “the least expensive good,” 
“something not extravagant,” “which avoids unnecessary waste,” 
“the careful, thrifty, frugal, and prudent management of money,” 
and “restraint.” While positive attributes, these definitions are 
insufficient to accommodate modern concepts of sustainability, 
quality, and whole-life costs that underpin value for money.
World Bank, Procurement in World Bank Investment Project Finance - 
Phase I: A Proposed New Framework 4 (Oct. 2013) (emphasis added), 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROCUREMENT/Re-
sources/ProcurementProposedNewFrameworkOctober2013Final.pdf. In 
undertaking these reforms, the Bank has specifically cited the need to 
embrace “[m]odern procurement methods such as competitive dialogue, 
negotiation, [and] best and final offer.” World Bank, Procurement in World 
Bank Investment Project Finance -- Phase II: Developing the Proposed 
New Procurement Framework, Framework Paper for Consultation 7 (July 
8, 2014), available at http://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/
procurement-policy-review-consultations.
4. New European Directive Opens Door to Broader Use 
of Negotiations for Best-Value Awards
Now the European Union has offered its own renewed support for best-
value-based multilateral negotiations, for reasons both predictable and 
Int’l 2-4
© 2015 Thomson Reuters
NOTES
surprising. The new directive specifically allows the use of “competitive 
dialogue” (carried over from the prior directive, 2004/18/EU) and “competi-
tive procedure with negotiation” (a new procedure). See Jonathan Davey, 
Procedures Involving Negotiation in the New Public Procurement Directive: 
Key Reforms to the Grounds for Use and the Procedural Rules, 2014 Pub. 
Proc. L. Rev. 103; Christopher R. Yukins, supra, 2014 Gov. Con. Year Rev. 
Briefs 3 (discussing two methods in detail). The new directive also places 
renewed emphasis on the use of best-value awards, where appropriate. 
See Paula Bordalo Faustino, Award Criteria in the New EU Directive on 
Public Procurement, 2014 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 124.
While U.S. rules do not set a preference between sealed bidding and 
competitive negotiations, see FAR 6.401, traditionally the European Union 
directives had strongly favored open tendering (as noted, akin to U.S. 
sealed bidding). The recitals to the new directive, however, now endorse 
the use of more flexible negotiations:
There is a great need for contracting authorities to have 
additional flexibility to choose a procurement procedure, which 
provides for negotiations. A greater use of those procedures is 
also likely to increase cross-border trade, as the evaluation 
has shown that contracts awarded by negotiated procedure 
with prior publication have a particularly high success rate of 
cross-border tenders. Member states should be able to provide 
for the use of competitive procedure with negotiation or the 
competitive dialogue, in various situations where open or 
restricted procedures without negotiations are not likely to lead 
to satisfactory procurement outcomes. It should be recalled that 
use of the competitive dialogue has significantly increased in 
terms of contract values over the past years. It has shown itself 
to be of use in cases where contracting authorities are unable to 
define the means of satisfying their needs or of assessing what 
the market can offer in terms of technical, financial or legal 
solutions. This situation may arise may arise in particular with 
innovative projects, the implementation of major integrated 
transport infrastructure projects, large computer networks or 
projects involving complex and structured financing.
Directive 2014/24/EU, Recital 42 (emphasis added). Although this recital 
to the public procurement directive is not legally binding, see, e.g., Michael 
Koeding, Active Transposition of EU Legislation, EIPASCOPE 2007/3, at 29 
(“recitals are not legally binding, but intend to help civil servants in Mem-
ber States to interpret the purpose of the directive’s provisions”), available 
at http://aei.pitt.edu/11064/1/20080313162050_MKA_SCOPE2007-3_In-
ternet-4.pdf, this recital does raise two important points.
• The recital’s italicized language points to recent Euro-
pean research which indicates that competitive dialogue 
and other forms of negotiation resulted in more cross-
border procurement -- significantly more than the average 
share of procurement, 1.4%, which is traditionally done across 
borders in the European Union. See Figure 1, infra; Zornitsa 
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Kutlina-Dimitrova & Csilla Lakato, Determinants of Direct 
Cross-Border Public Procurement in EU Member States, at 
page 7 & Fig. 5 (European Commission Chief Economist Note, 
July 2014) (“compared to the average in EU Member States 
of 1.4%, other types of procedures such as the ones awarded 
through competitive dialogue, negotiated with competition and 
accelerated negotiated procedures are found to be significantly 
above the average in terms of number of contracts awarded 
to foreigners[, and] [i]n terms of value, the same patter[n]s 
are revealed”), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2014/july/tradoc_152700.pdf. 
• The recital gives examples of procurements, such as for 
“large computer networks” or “projects involving complex and 
structured financing,” which are well-suited to competitive 
dialogue or a competitive procedure with negotiation. 
While these examples are not binding or exclusive, see, e.g., 
Jonathan Davey, supra, 2014 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. at 106-07, the 
examples could prove extremely persuasive if firms, involved 
in the cited types of procurements, hope to convince procuring 
authorities that they should use these more flexible methods. 
See also Directive 2014/24/EU, Art. 26(4) (discussing conditions 
for use of two methods).
5. European Data Offer New Perspective on  
Negotiations’ Benefits
The first point cited above, regarding new European data on cross-
border procurement which was endorsed by the directive, bears special em-
phasis, because that data may reshape the debate regarding multilateral 
competitive negotiations. For years, that debate has focused on the benefits 
of flexible negotiations to the buyer -- observers have argued that methods 
such as competitive dialogue give buyers badly needed new flexibility in 
procurement. See, e.g., European Commission, Public Procurement Reform 
-- Factsheet No. 3: Simplifying the Rules for Contracting Authorities, at 1, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/
modernising_rules/reform_proposals/index_en.htm. 
The new European data offer, in contrast, a completely new per-
spective: that cross-border trade may be boosted by a more flexible 
approach to procurement, using negotiations. This, in turn, suggests 
that more flexible negotiation procedures may be good for suppliers, for 
suppliers may be willing to risk more in cross-border procurements if 
the procedures are more flexible, based on more open exchanges regard-
ing best-value solutions for the purchasing agency. This point -- that 
negotiated-best-value methods may be better for suppliers, too, because 
the more flexible methods reduce risk and accommodate vendors’ new 
sources of value -- echoes U.S. industry’s opposition to price-based 
(LPTA-type) procurements in the federal government (discussed above), 
though the European data seem to lend new support, from a different 
perspective, for this proposition. Further analysis will be needed, but 
the initial European data, embraced in the new procurement directive, 
suggest that more flexible procurements with negotiations ultimately 
Int’l 2-6
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may deliver better value and enhanced competition in international 
procurement markets.
Figure 1: Determinants of Cross-Border Trade, supra, Table 5. Chart 
illustrates the share of covered European procurement done cross-
border, by type of procurement procedure.
B. Corruption and Compliance Challenges Under the New 
Directive
The new European procurement directive also highlights another major 
point of convergence -- and difference -- between U.S. and European procure-
ment: corruption and compliance. See Christopher R. Yukins, supra, 2014 Gov. 
Con. Year Rev. Br. 3 (discussing problems with draft directive’s provisions 
on corruption). Unlike the Federal Acquisition Regulation, which addresses 
issues of corruption extensively in FAR Part 3 (Improper Business Practices 
and Personal Conflicts of Interest) and FAR Part 9 (Contractor Qualifications), 
the new European directive reflects only a partial, if positive, step towards 
addressing corruption and compliance in procurement. See, e.g., Hans-Joachim 
Priess, The Rules on Exclusion and Self-Cleaning Under the 2014 Public 
Procurement Directive, 2014 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 112, 123 (“Although art. 57 
leaves several questions unanswered, it must be regarded as a significant 
step towards a greater harmonisation of the public procurement law in the 
EU.”); Rhodri Williams, Anti-Corruption Measures in the EU as They Affect 
Public Procurement, 2014 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. NA95 (discussing studies of cor-
ruption in the European Union leading up to new directive). 
1. Grounds for Exclusion
Article 57 of the new directive sets forth a number of mandatory 






Table 5: EU public procurement covered in the dataset by type of procedure (2008-2012) 
                                            Number of awards per year Award value (€ millions) per year 




procedure 602 17 2.8% 629 34 5.4% 
Accelerated restricted 
procedure 1,957 48 2.5% 2,399 124 5.2% 
Award without 
publication 6,067 69 1.1% 1,990 50 2.5% 
Competitive dialogue 411 17 4.0% 5,289 115 2.2% 
Negotiated procedure 
with competition 8,429 286 3.4% 19,106 1,275 6.7% 
Negotiated procedure  
without competition 8,400 415 4.9% 8,544 743 8.7% 
Open procedure 207,651 2,327 1.1% 114,155 3,343 2.9% 
Restricted procedure 10,272 203 2.0% 29,100 977 3.4% 
Source: TED, own calculations 
2.2   REGIONAL AND SECTORAL OVERVIEW 
In a next step, we focus on a more disaggregated regional and sectoral overview of 
EU public procurement. Table 6 reveals interesting patterns about the distribution of 
EU public procurement by the country of the awarding authority and the share of 
cross-border awards in terms of number and value of awards. On the one hand, when 
considering the total number of awards, Poland (31%), France (25%) and Germany 
(6%) account for the majority of contracts awarded by EU member states. On the 
other hand, the share of different member states in the total value of public 
procurement contracts shows a less concentrated picture with France (19%), Poland 
(13%), Italy (12%) and the United Kingdom (12%) in top of contracting authorities.  
In addition, we find that there is significant variation in terms of the share of cross-
border awards across different EU Member States. While the EU average cross-
border share in terms of number of awards is around 1.4%, this share is significantly 
higher for Luxembourg (17%), Malta (16%) and Ireland (14%). Finally, in value 
terms, the share of cross-border contracts is highest for smaller member states like 
Malta (41%), Cyprus (17%) and Luxemburg (16%), compared to an average of 3.7% 
for the EU as a whole. These descriptive statistics at the Member State level could be 
a first indication of the fact that variables such as population might be inversely 
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• Participation in a criminal organization;
• Corruption under the national laws of the contracting author-
ity or the vendor, including potentially corruption under other 
nations’ laws, see Hans-Joachim Priess, supra, at 115 (“There-
fore, in case the economic operator has its seat of business 
outside the EU, the local definition of corruption must also be 
considered. Hence, a conviction for corruption by a court of the 
country—even one outside the EU or EEA area—where the 
economic operator is located may arguably also constitute a 
ground for exclusion.”);
• Fraud -- though only with regard to “fraud affecting the Euro-
pean Communities’ financial interests,” as defined by Article 
1 of the Convention on the Protection of the European Com-
munities’ Financial Interests;
• Terrorist offenses;
• Money laundering or terrorist financing; and,
• Child labor and other forms of human trafficking.
Article 57 also calls for mandatory exclusion where, among other 
things, the procuring authority knows that the vendor has not paid its 
taxes or its social security obligations. Member states may override a 
mandatory exclusion on any of these grounds on an exceptional basis, for 
“reasons relating to the public interest such as public health or protection 
of the environment.” Member states also may derogate from a mandatory 
exclusion for failure to pay taxes or social security obligations, if “exclusion 
would be clearly disproportionate.” Article 57 further says that member 
states may exclude vendors on a number of grounds, including “where the 
economic operator has shown significant or persistent deficiencies in the 
performance of a substantive requirement under a prior public contract” 
-- and important step forward in allowing European procuring agencies 
to address past failures in contractor performance. See Hans-Joachim 
Priess, supra, at 120-21 (discussing exclusions and exceptions in detail); 
Hans-Joachim Priess, Anti-Corruption Internationally: Challenges in 
Procurement Markets Abroad, 2013 Gov. Con. Year Rev. Br. 5 (discussing 
draft directive in context of international anti-corruption efforts).
2. Corruption Risks the New European Directive Does 
Not Address
From a U.S. perspective, none of this seems surprising. European 
Article 57’s grounds for exclusion accord with a U.S. contracting officer’s 
broad discretion to exclude “non-responsible” vendors, per FAR Subpart 9.1, 
and with U.S. suspension and debarment officials’ sweeping authority to 
exclude vendors, government-wide, for any “cause of so serious or compel-
ling a nature that it affects the present responsibility of the contractor or 
subcontractor.” FAR 9.406-2(c). What is surprising to those familiar with 
the U.S. federal system, however, is what is missing from Article 57 of the 
new European directive:
• No Debarment System: The directive does not contemplate 
a regularized system of debarment. Instead, exclusion is to be 
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done on a contract-by-contract basis, by contracting officials who 
may (or may not) have expertise in the grounds for exclusion; 
a contracting official may not, for example, know how to judge 
whether a vendor truly owes social security taxes. In the United 
States, this problem -- contracting officials’ lack of expertise 
in the grounds for exclusion -- is what helped undo the Clin-
ton administration’s efforts to use U.S. contracting officers to 
“blacklist” vendors for certain types of labor and environmental 
violations. See, e.g., Bush Administration Suspends “Blacklist-
ing” Rule, OFCCP Federal Contract Compliance Manual, Letter 
No. 226, 2001 WL 36651498 (CCH May 30, 2001). 
• Exclusion as Calibrated Punishment: Rather than using 
exclusion as a means of addressing the peculiar reputational 
and performance risks that wayward contractors may pose, as 
the U.S. system does, see, e.g., Joseph D. West, Timothy J. Hatch, 
Christyne K. Brennan & Lawrence J.C. Van Dyke, Suspension 
& Debarment, 06-9 Briefing Papers 1, 6-7 (Aug. 2006); Steven A. 
Shaw, Mike Wagner & Robert Nichols, Contractor Responsibil-
ity: Toward An Integrated Approach To Legal Risk Management, 
13-4 Briefing Papers 1 (Mar. 2013), Article 57 seems to con-
template a graduated system of punishment, with mandatory 
exclusion reserved for the most serious offenses. This approach, 
much like the World Bank’s graduated approach to sanctions, 
see World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines, available at http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/
WorldBankSanctioningGuidelines.pdf, treats exclusion as a 
form of graduated punishment, rather than risk mitigation. See, 
e.g., Christopher R. Yukins, Rethinking the World Bank’s Sanc-
tions System, 55 GC. ¶ 355 (Nov. 2013). The U.S. approach is far 
more flexible, and leaves it to contracting officers (on individual 
procurements) and suspension and debarment officials (agency- 
and government-wide) to assess and address contractor-specific 
risk, both to prospective projects (performance risk) and to the 
government’s legitimacy (reputation risk).
• Directive Does Not Tackle Fraud: Although, for example, a 
2011 study commissioned by the European Commission specifi-
cally called for, at the EU level, “better monitoring, detection, 
analysis, and reporting technology to fight fraud and corrup-
tion,” and to “make these available to Member States,” see PwC 
EU Services, Public Procurement: Costs We Pay for Corruption 
-- Identifying and Reducing Corruption in Public Procure-
ment in the EU, at 12 (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
anti_fraud/documents/anti-fraud-policy/research-and-studies/
pwc_olaf_study_en.pdf, the new European directive does not 
offer an integrated solution to address fraud in contract per-
formance. 
3. New Directive -- On Contractor Compliance 
What will perhaps be most surprising to U.S. observers is the very 
limited approach taken to contractor compliance, under the new direc-
Int’l 2-9
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tive. While U.S. procurement law, building on a robust framework of U.S. 
compliance rules, generally assumes that contractor compliance systems 
will always be used, see, e.g., FAR 52.203-13, the new directive assumes 
that “self-cleaning” (compliance) measures will be put in place only after 
a contractor engages in misconduct. See Directive 2014/24/EU, Art. 57(6) 
(“Any [specifically affected] economic operator . . . may provide evidence 
to the effect that measures taken by the economic operator are sufficient 
to demonstrate its reliability despite the existence of a relevant ground 
for exclusion.”). 
The European directive’s limited approach, which treats compliance 
efforts as remedial measures rather than as ongoing risk mitigation 
measures, is especially surprising in light of the UK Ministry of Justice 
guidelines under the UK Bribery Act of 2010. The United Kingdom’s ap-
proach, which follows a worldwide trend, see, e.g., Hans-Joachim Priess, 
Anti-Corruption Internationally: Challenges in Procurement Markets 
Abroad, supra, is to require that anti-corruption compliance measures be 
put in place by all firms -- not only those that have engaged in miscon-
duct. See UK Ministry of Justice, UK Bribery Act 2010 -- Guidance, at 7 
(Mar. 2011), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/181762/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf. The 
disconnect between emerging international best practices in compliance 
and the new directive suggests that, over time, the European compliance 
requirements for contractors may expand, to conform more closely to 
international norms.
4. New Challenge: Labor Compliance
For compliance officers on both sides of the Atlantic, perhaps the most 
notable new area of compliance concern is labor compliance. The new Eu-
ropean directive makes labor violations a potential basis for exclusion, as 
does an executive order issued by President Barack Obama in July 2014.
The new European directive provides, in Recital 39, that:
It should . . . be possible to include clauses ensuring compliance 
with collective agreements in compliance with Union law in 
public contracts. Non-compliance with the relevant obligations 
could be considered to be grave misconduct on the part of the 
economic operator concerned, liable to exclusion of that economic 
operator from the procedure for the award of a public contract
(Emphasis added.) Article 57(4)(c) goes on to say that a contractor may 
be excluded “where the contracting authority can demonstrate by appro-
priate means that the economic operator is guilty of grave professional 
misconduct, which renders its integrity questionable.” Although Recital 39 
(as noted) is not legally binding, the recital is likely to be read in conjunc-
tion with Article 18(2), which calls for member states to “take appropriate 
measures to ensure that in the performance of public contracts economic 
operators comply with applicable obligations in the fields of environmental, 
social and labour law established by Union law, national law, collective 
agreements or by the international environmental, social and labour law 
provisions.” If a contractor is badly out of step with collective bargain-
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ing agreements, or otherwise engages in serious violations of labor law, 
stakeholders -- including unions -- may argue that the contractor should 
be excluded under the new directive. See, e.g., European Trade Union 
Confederation, New EU Framework on Public Procurement: ETUC Key 
Points for the Transposition of Directive 2014/24/EU, at 9 (trade union 
confederation discussing labor protections gained under new directive), 
available at http://www.etuc.org/sites/www.etuc.org/files/publication/files/
ces-brochure_transpo_edited_03.pdf.
The Obama administration took a similar approach in the President’s 
“Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces” executive order, which was issued on 
July 31, 2014. Under that executive order, a contractor could be subject 
to exclusion if a contracting official, in consultation with a “labor compli-
ance official,” concluded that the contractor engaged in violations (“par-
ticularly serious, repeated, willful, or pervasive violations”) of certain 
labor laws. E.O. 13673, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/07/31/executive-order-fair-pay-and-safe-workplaces. Although 
the executive order remains to be implemented in regulation, the order 
has stirred a storm of controversy because it could force a contracting 
officer to sit, in practical terms, as a judge of labor violations -- an area 
in which contracting officers are not necessarily experienced. See, e.g., 
Executive Order Targets Contractor Compliance With Labor Laws, 56 GC 
¶ 266 (Aug. 13, 2014); Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order—
New Rules Require Federal Contractors And Subcontractors To Track And 
Report Labor Violations, 38 Constr. Contr. L. Rep. NL 14 (Sept. 12, 2014).
III. TRADE AGREEMENT IMPLICATIONS: E-PROCUREMENT
As the discussion above reflects, the new European directive carries 
important practical ramifications for firms that hope to compete in the 
European public procurement markets. Here, we review how the new 
directive also may affect the United States’ ongoing trade negotiations 
with the European Union.
The United States and the European Union are engaged in protracted 
negotiations regarding the proposed Transatlantic Trade & Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), which would liberalize trade and establish an ongo-
ing system to harmonize regulatory schemes between the United States 
and Europe, so as to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade. See, e.g., Allen B. 
Green & Marques O. Peterson, Converging Procurement Systems -- Part 
II: International Trade and Public Procurement 2013 Update, 2014 Gov’t 
Cont. Year Rev. Br. 2 (Feb. 2014). Procurement remains an important point 
of discussion in those TTIP negotiations. See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins 
& Hans-Joachim Priess, Feature Comment: Breaking The Impasse In The 
Transatlantic Trade And Investment Partnership (TTIP) Negotiations: 
Rethinking Priorities In Procurement, 56 GC ¶ 235 (July 24, 2014). 
Any TTIP agreement between the European Union and the United 
States may well address a recurring issue in opening procurement mar-
kets: transparency, importantly including transparency as to procurement 
opportunities. In addressing this and other elements of open procurement 
markets, the TTIP negotiations may be influenced by the Canada - Eu-
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ropean Union Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), 
which is currently being finalized. See, e.g., Jean Heilman Grier, Major 
Procurement Gains in Canada-EU Agreement (Nov. 1, 2013), available 
at http://trade.djaghe.com/?p=78. Under CETA, Canada has assured the 
European Union that Canadian procurement opportunities at both the 
central and sub-central levels (i.e., federal and provincial) will be accessible 
through a “single point of entry.” See CETA (provisional text), Chapter X, 
Art. VI (“All the notices of intended procurement shall be directly acces-
sible [by electronic means free of charge through a single point of access . 
. .”), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/21.aspx?lang=eng. 
Although the U.S. federal government already uses a “governmentwide 
point of entry,” www.fedbizopps.gov, to publicize federal opportunities on a 
centralized website, see, e.g., FAR 5.003, in the United States sub-central 
(e.g., state) opportunities do not appear on that site. Many states’ procure-
ment-related websites are available through the National Institute for 
Government Procurement (NIGP), http://www.nigp.org/eweb/StartPage.
aspx?Site=NIGP&webcode=gs_stateproclinks, but opportunities on state 
websites are not channeled through a central site -- as Canada has prom-
ised to do for the European Union. Given Canada’s willingness to establish 
a consolidated site (over a five-year transitional period, see CETA, Ch. X, 
Art. VI(1) & Annex X-02), and the European Union’s stated goal, in the 
new directive, to transition completely to electronic procurement in the 
coming years, see Roger Bickerstaff, E-Procurement Under the New EU 
Procurement Directives, 2014 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 134, the European Union 
may argue that the United States, too, should agree in TTIP to make 
its procurement opportunities (both “central” and “sub-central”) readily 
available on a single website.
IV. CONCLUSION
The new European procurement directives, which are currently being 
transposed into member states’ procurement laws, share many common 
features with U.S. procurement law. European policymakers are increas-
ingly willing to allow flexible forms of negotiated procurement, similar 
to competitive negotiations in the United States, and the European anti-
corruption measures under the new directive are similar in many ways 
to their U.S. counterparts. There remain, however, significant differences 
between the two systems -- such as differences in contractor compliance 
requirements, and in publicizing procurement opportunities -- which need 
to be addressed if harmonization is to help erase unnecessary barriers to 
trade between the U.S. and European procurement markets. 
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